

National Tribune.

"TO CARE FOR HIM WHO HAS BORNE THE BATTLE, AND FOR HIS WIDOW AND ORPHANS."

ESTABLISHED 1877—NEW SERIES.

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REAL RUSSIA.

The Narrative of a Sojourn in the
Czar's Country.

THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

Imperial Guards, Corps of Gren-
adiers and the Line.

HOME AGAIN.

An Uneventful Journey Back
to the United States.

BY THE "CANNONIER."

To Clinton Beckwith, commander-in-chief of the
old Sixth Corps, associate in the enterprises of
peace and blood, to whom I was indebted for
the opportunity of the travel pictured herein, this
sketch is affectionately dedicated by the
author.

X.
THE Russian Army
consists of—1st, the
Imperial Guard; 2d,
the Corps of Gren-
adiers; and, 3d, the
Line.

The Guard is a
corps *per se*, complete,
embracing all
arms of the service,
and its established
strength is 42,000
infantry, 6,000 cavalry,
and 2,000 artillery
and engineers (these
last being known as
the Engineers of the
Imperial General
Staff). The number
of guns is 84, in 14 batteries, of which 12 are
field and two are horse batteries.

The Corps of Grenadiers is an organiza-
tion of infantry and artillery only, and dif-
fers from the Line only in the larger size of
the men. It consists of three divisions with
12 batteries, and its establishment is 36,000
men and 52 guns. The artillery of the
Grenadiers does not differ in any considerable
degree from that of the Line.

The regimental organization of infantry
in the above-described corps *défile* is the
same as in the Line; that is to say, each
regiment,

CALLED IN RUSSIAN "POLK,"
consists of four battalions of four companies
—or *rotas*—of 200 men each on a peace foot-
ing, and 250 in war, besides a fifth battalion,
called the depot, or reserve, which remains
at the territorial or local headquarters of the
regiment, and serves as a school for recruit-
ment. This battalion also takes the field
when necessary in time of war. The regi-
ments are "localized" for recruiting pur-
poses, and they are not numbered, but are
designated by the name of the town where the
recruiting depot is located. For exam-
ple, "the Regiment of Kazan," "the Regiment
of Kharkoff," "the Regiment of Moscow," etc.

The cavalry consists of cuirassiers (of
the Guard), hussars (lancers), dragoons,
Hussars, and Cossacks. The latter are of
two descriptions, Regular and Irregular, the
Regulars being in service for the ordinary
term of enlistment, while the Irregulars are
called out for war only and mustered out
on the return of peace. The total force of
cavalry on a peace footing, exclusive of Cossacks,
is about 60,000, and there are about
24,000 Regular Cossacks. The force of Ir-
regular Cossacks is variable, but is com-
monly estimated at 70,000—including the
Don, the Kuban, the Ukraine, the Ural, and
the Siberian Cossacks.

THE REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION
of the Regular cavalry is six squadrons
of 150 men each in time of peace, and eight
squadrons in time of war; though nearly
every regiment that I saw was considerably
below the establishment in numbers present
for duty, which the officers said was due to
the liberal system of furloughing men in
time of peace.

Aside from the Guards and Grenadiers,
the Russian army is organized in perma-
nent army corps. Each corps has its own
territory, the Empire being divided into
military departments for that purpose. A
Russian army corps consists normally of
three divisions. Each division has two bri-
gades, and each brigade two regiments, or
eight battalions. As the normal strength of
the battalion is a little less than 800, this
would make the brigade about 6,000, the
division about 12,000, and the corps about
36,000 strong, of infantry alone. The arti-
llery of the army corps consists of 10 field
batteries and two horse-batteries; about
2,000 men, with 72 guns. Each corps has
also one brigade of Regular cavalry—generally
dragoons—and a brigade of Regular
Cossacks.

It should be remarked that the so-called
"brigade" of two regiments is not usually
operated as a tactical unit, but that each
four-battalion regiment is termed "demi-
brigade" in the field, and is handled as the
regular unit of maneuver, in drill and ac-
tion. Owing to the localization of the regi-
ments, great esprit *de corps* and rivalry exist
among them, and their traditions are care-
fully cherished in camp-songs and legends.
Some of them carry, in addition to their
own colors, French flags captured in the
Napoleonic wars, Turkish standards, and
other trophies of earlier struggles. In some
regiments they cherish the memory of cer-
tain comrades—who fell under circumstances
of extraordinary heroism—by bearing their
names perpetually on the present-for-duty
roll and calling them at every roll-call;
when a Sergeant answers, "Killed in action"
at such or such a battle, whatever it may be.

The Cavalry Brigade consists of three regi-

ments, each 900 strong on peace footing and
1,300 for war. Each corps has three com-
panies of engineers and one complete pon-
toon-train, with the necessary transport
establishment. The strength of a Russian
army corps is therefore about 44,000, of all
ranks and arms, on a peace footing, of whom,
at a rate from 35,000 to 38,000 will be found
present for duty. The full war footing aug-
ments the peace strength by about 30 per
cent, on the first call of the reserves.

There are nine corps *terres* in European
Russia, one in Finland, two in Western
Siberia, and four in the Caucasus. In ad-
dition to these there is a large artillery re-
serve and a general corps of cavalry, ex-
clusive of that belonging to the army corps.
The nine corps in European Russia, the one
in Finland, and at least one of the four in
the Caucasus would be instantly available
for war on the western frontier, together
with the Guards, Grenadiers, reserve artillery
and the general Cavalry Corps.

Of the four corps in the Army of the Cau-
casus large detachments are always employed
in the Trans-Caspian country, and would
hence be available only for a movement
against British India by way of Herat and
Kandahar.

Behind this establishment of the active
army are two lines of reserves, modeled
generally after the Prussian system of
"Landwehr" and "Landsturm,"
these of each military department sustaining
a fixed corporate relation to the local army
corps, which need not be described in detail
here.

The active force in European Russia, which
would be available for immediate mobiliza-
tion, consists, first, of the Imperial Guard and
the Corps of Grenadiers; second, nine corps
terres of troops of the Line of all arms, and
third, the Cossacks of the Don. The Guard
and the Grenadiers have their headquarters
at St. Petersburg, as does also the First
Army Corps. The Second Corps is at Wilna.
The Third Corps is at Riga. The Sixth
Corps is at Moscow. The Eighth Corps is
at Kazan. The Ninth Corps is at Kazan.
The Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Corps are
respectively in the Crimea, in Bessarabia (on
the Rumanian frontier) and in Volynia (on
the Galician frontier). The strength of the
Guards and Grenadiers is calculated to be
50,000 effective. The strength of a Russian
army corps is calculated to be about 40,000
of all arms, and its organization shows a
somewhat larger proportion of cavalry and
artillery than is usual in the armies of
Western Europe. The force of Don Cossacks
which could be instantly mobilized for
service on the western frontier is calculated
to be 50,000. In addition to these forces,
provided Turkey remained neutral, another
complete army corps could be made up from
the

ARMY OF THE CAUCASUS
and brought into European Russia either by
marching over the mountains to Vladikav-
kaz or in transports across the Black Sea
from Batoum to Odessa. My observation
was that the army corps were kept pretty well
up to the paper standard in numbers. The
troops are furloughed a good deal when
quiet prevails, but they seldom or never
desert, and can all be recalled to the colors
inside of a week. Without doubt every one
of the nine corps in European Russia could
take the field with an effective of at least
36,000. In the event of war with Austria
and Germany the Second Corps at Wilna,
the Sixth at Warsaw and the Seventh at
Kiev might be considered as within immediate
striking distance of the frontier, and two of
them could be massed at any point of con-
centration by rail from Wilna on the north
to Wolosky on the south.

Wilna is the point where the East
Prussian railway system converges on the
Russian frontier. It is a small town, un-
fortified, and there is nothing to indicate
its character as a frontier station, except
the Customs House. The same is true of
Lodz, the German station across the line.
Wolosky is of similar description and
is the first Russian station on the line,
passing through Galicia via Krakow and
Lemberg. The Russian line from Wolosky
inland runs direct to Odessa in one
direction, and to Kiev, Kark, Orel, Tula,
and Moscow in the other. These two points
—Wilna and Wolosky—mark the extreme
ends of the western frontier of Russia,
so far as railway communication is con-
cerned. The distance between them in a
straight line is about 420 miles, but, owing
to the westerly projection of Poland as a
salient the actual frontier line is nearly
1,600 miles long.

THE LONG FRONTIER
is crossed by railways at Gdajewo on the
Bialystok and Koenigsberg route; at Mawa
on the Warsaw and Danzig route; at Alex-
androwo on the Warsaw and Berlin route;
at Grunowitz and Sandomierz near Krakow,
where the Silesian line from Breslau and
Posen and the Bohemian line from Prague
and Vienna unite with the Russian trunk
lines to St. Petersburg, to Moscow, and to
Odessa; and at Radzivilow, on the route
from Vienna, via Krakow and Lemberg, to
Kiev, Karkow, and Kusk. From Alex-
androwo on the north to Grunowitz on the
south the Polish frontier presents an arc of
a circle, crossed by no railways from the
Russian side, but closely approached by two
lines on the German side, which skirt it at
an average distance of a day's march. This
is the weak point of the frontier of Russian
Poland. The Germans can debouch troops
by rail within a day's march of any point
on it, while the Russians cannot reach it in
less than three days' march from any point
on the two roads that branch from Sierad-
z Junction north to Alexandrowo and
south to Grunowitz.

As against a combination of Germany and
Austria, therefore, Russian Poland presents
the aspect of a huge salient; having no
flanking positions of defense; which must
be defended upon diverging lines; which
may be attacked by converging forces at
two or more points; which can only be re-
inforced and provisioned from the proper
rear; and in which but little attention has
been paid to the construction of railways to

short and handy cross-lines of rear com-
munication on the part of a defensive force.
On the other hand, the German railways on
the north and west faces and the Austrian lines
on the south face of this salient skirt are
almost entirely within easy marching dis-
tance, while the Russian railroads all ap-
proach it at right angles, none of them
skirting it—at least not within distances that
would be deemed practical for parallel move-
ments of troops designed to hold in check
an invasion of uncertain objective. The
experience of that war could not go far to-
ward demonstrating the possibilities of a
conflict with Germany and Austria in Poland.
As to supplies and material of war,
Russia is full of them. Her resources in
grain, meat, clothing, horses, arms and
munitions are inexhaustible, and her principal
bases for the collection of stores are far in-
land, beyond the reach of the most daring
invader. The country immediately border-
ing on Germany and Austria is the poorest
and least productive part of the Empire in
the same latitude. There would be no pos-
sibility of a large invading force living off
the country for any considerable time.

Under these circumstances celerity would
be everything to the Germans and Austrians.
Their facilities of mobilization, at least those
of the Germans, are too well known to re-
quire analysis here. An officer of the Prussian
staff, Von Schwabach, told me that the
four German army corps at Konigsberg,
Bromberg, Posen and Breslau could be con-
centrated at Sieradz Junction, in the heart
of Poland, and only 63 verses (say 45
miles) from Warsaw, before either of the
Russian Army corps at St. Petersburg, Mos-
cow or Riga could reinforce that place. The
Austrians, he said, would be slower, but at
least three Austrian corps could be within
supporting distance of the German advance
before the Russians could reach the ground
in any considerable force. If Von Schwabach
is correct, and there is every reason to
suppose that he is, such a movement as he
intimated must result in the immediate
capture of Warsaw, because the four Ger-
man corps of which he spoke mean at least
120,000 muskets, with proportionate cavalry
and artillery, and the three Austrian corps
would muster about 90,000, while the gar-
risons of Warsaw and other Polish towns
comprising the Sixth Russian Corps, to-
gether with the Second Corps from Wilna,
would not amount to an effective of more
than 80,000. The result of such an encoun-
ter

CANNOT BE DOUBTFUL
to anyone who knows anything about the
composition and spirit of the German
army. Prolonged operations, giving the
Russians time to get out their vast terri-
torial reserves, might change the face of
affairs; but it does not seem possible that
the Russians could retake Warsaw after the
Germans and Austrians were once fairly in-
stalled in it and their numerous lines of
communication well established in their
rear. If the railway systems of Germany and
Austria had been designed with the expres-
sion of an allied descent upon Russian
Poland, they could not have been better
adapted to that object than they are; while
the Russians, in building their own connec-
tions to the frontier, seem to have exactly
supplemented the Austro-German plan. Some
idea of the German facilities for handling
troops by rail may be gained from the fact
that on the occasion of the Emperor's birth-
day, about 80,000 men were brought to
Berlin from all parts of the Empire and sent
back again within six days, and a person
traveling over the lines during that time
would hardly have noticed it. Some time
after that I saw in Russia a considerable
movement of troops in consequence of the
installation of the Carewitsch as Hetman of
the Don Cossacks at Nowo Tscherkassk.
The difference was great. Though not more
than half of 80,000 men were handled in the
Russian operation, yet civil traffic was in-
terrupted or demoralized for several days
on the lines which were brought into re-
quisition.

During the two years elapsed since the
above observations were made, the Russians
have largely increased their facilities of mo-
bilization and transport, both by improve-
ment of existing lines and building new
ones, particularly in the direction of the
Galician frontier, where they were weakest.
Generally speaking, however, it is no less
true now than then that the beginning of a
war between Russia and Austro-Germany
must almost inevitably be marked by Rus-
sian reverses. If France should take a hand
in the conditions would, of course, be alter-
ed. But it was my impression then, and I

AT THE WASHINGTON DOG SHOW.



Veteran—The men who are glad to pay \$25,000 for an imported bull-dog, and whose wealth was made possible by what I and my comrades did, are the ones who are most clamorous against allowing me and them, out of the overfull Treasury, enough to support decently the lives we wrecked in their service.

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THE GENERAL STAFF
has an elaborate theoretical plan of mobiliza-
tion by rail, but it has never been tried
except in the Turkish war 10 years ago,
when the railway system of Russia was
much less extensive than it is now. The
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EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: In your issue
of a recent date I read an article, "Scouts' Ad-
ventures—Experiences of Two who Tried to
find out where the Enemy was." I knew W.
J. Lee and Judson Knight well. I also know
that those who were the least conspicuous and
did the least service in the "Secret Service"
during the war, were the first to rush into
print after the war was over, blazoning their
mighty deeds of valor and shrewdness to the
world by stealing other men's thunder who
really performed the service, though they
would not claim any great credit for doing just
what was assigned them to do.

I know the above to be true from experience
—the "Back to the Front" article, etc. of one
C. S. Bell, that was published as a serial in the
New York Ledger in 1870, of which I may
write you in the future.

The incident referred to in regard to Lee
do not sound at all familiar; besides, Lee, as all
deserters from the rebel army were, was not
trusted to any great extent by either Gen.
Hooker or Meade; besides, Gen. Patrick, the
President-Marshal, General, Army of the Potomac,
and Col. George H. Sharpe, his Deputy,
were very loath to accept as strictly true any
report they might make. My recollection is
that Lee, as a deserter, was a man of a high
scout or spy, for I remember that Capt. Cline,
of the 2d Ind. Cav., absolutely refused to make
a trip to Culpeper Courthouse with Lee as a
guide, lest he should reveal a secret, in his stead.
I give you this for whatever disposition you
wish to make of it. As to myself, I refer you
to the "Official Records of the Union and Con-
federate Armies," volume 27, page 307, and
volume 28, pages 372, 38, and more to come; also,
to Gen. J. J. Reynolds, now in Washington;
also, Gen. C. C. Kelton, who may remember
something of me.—M. P. HUNTSVILLE, Sergeant,
Co. I, 73d Ohio, on detached service, Army
of the Potomac, War, Tex.

No Manufactured Honeycomb.
EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: In your issue
of Feb. 19, under head of "Health Hints," oc-
curred these words:
"The only parallel is the manufacture of
honeycombs from stinging and glue, and a
person who, like the patriarchs of old, would
live in milk and honey, might nowadays risk
the loss of his life by indulging in the use of
this food as widely as it is advertised by your
paper, having an immense circulation."
Honeycombs are not manufactured and
filled with glue, nor can they be. In fact,
you will not find an imitation honey in the
market even. The pure article is too plentiful.
I presume Dr. Oswald read the article in
the Popular Science Monthly in 1881, and the
American Cyclopaedia has the same false state-
ment.

A. L. Root, of Medina, O., has a standing
offer of \$1,000 for a specimen of manufactured
comb honey, made several years since, and
none has yet been presented. I have been in
the bee business several years, and have heard
of manufactured comb honey; but when the
rumor was first generally originated in
some one's brain, having the idea that a
Yankee can make or imitate anything.—J. L.
GUYEN, M. D., Norwich, O.

had not seen reason since to change it, that
Germany and Austria combined would prove
more than a match for France and Russia.

The return trip was not eventful. Travel-
ing from St. Petersburg by way of War-
saw and Breslau to Berlin, I spent a few
days in the latter place and then proceeded
via Cologne and Paris to Dieppe by rail—
passing through Paris in two hours and 40
minutes; a feat doubtless never accom-
plished by any other American. I had been
there before—not "many a time," but quite
enough; and for some reason never enjoyed
the place half so much as I did Berlin, St.
Petersburg or Moscow. From Dieppe to
Southampton by boat and thence to New
York in the Traave, of the North German
Lloyd Steamship line, ended the trip.
[The End.]

SCENE IN A SOLDIER'S HOME.

BY CAPT. JACK CHAWFORD, "THE POET SCOUT."

Adjutant, read that letter again,
I kin surely believe my ears—
My heart's 'gittin' madder 'n a sin,
As I creep along in your room,
An' it sounds like home again for John to say,
He wants me at home agin' in right away.

That's w'at it says, dead sure, sure,
An' he calls me his "father dear,"
That, after drivin' me from his door,
An' a forcin' of me here.
I reckon the Lord has took my part,
By givin' the boy a change of heart.

His wife, she writes a line or two,
Says, "how they miss me at home,"
An' how she weeps at the sad, sad view
O' my empty easy-chair.

Well, well, w'at's the world a-drivin' at,
W'en it brings about such changes as that?
I'll tell you, Adjutant, how it was:
John married two years ago.

An' he said it was for my good, because
I was gittin' old, you know,
An' he reckoned we needed a woman there
To tend the house and give me some care.

She seemed like a angel spoutin' wings,
Under John's trainin', I guess,
An' she loped around an' looked arter things,
With remarkable quickness.

An' to me she was just as good an' kind
As any man's darter you could find.
W'en John come in from the field one day,
He says to me, "father," see here.

"You're a gittin' old, an' in feeble way,
W'y not deed the farm to me?
Then you'll have no care, an' me 'n my wife
Will see to your comfort all your life."

Well, Adjutant, that looked proper, quite,
An' I told him I was agreed,
An' he went to town to lawyer that night,
An' he had him make out the deed.

An' then I loped back in my old arm-chair,
An' I thanked the Lord that I hadn't a care.
All at once Amanda got awful cross,
An' never give me a smile.

An' John begun to tear round an' boss
In a most presumptuous style,
An' he'd attempt to take the good Lord above
He'd crush me by sayin', "I'm master here."

Things got a gittin' worse and worse,
An' it come in my head one mornin',
Like a shot from an old-time blunderbuss,
That the old man was in the way.

An' now that they had the property,
The nex' move was to get rid of me.
An' so they made a hell on earth
O' the home I loved so dear.

An' the boy he looked awful since his birth
Insted on wadin' me here,
An' Amanda clipped in, sayin' spitefully,
"Twas the only place fit for such as you."

An' now they are sorry. Say, Adjutant,
Just w'en I'm a letter far
How happy they've made me, and how I want
To return to them instantly.

An' tell 'em I thank the good Lord above
For fillin' their hearts with the old-time love.
But hold on! Aha! I see it now—
Tear that up, and write 'em that I

Am happy and satisfied here, an' how
I'll stay right till I die—
That two thousand dollar bill pension I got
Is the Lord that's a movin' their hearts. Eh?
What?

"Scout's Adventures." IN YOUR issue
of a recent date I read an article, "Scouts' Ad-
ventures—Experiences of Two who Tried to
find out where the Enemy was." I knew W.
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that those who were the least conspicuous and
did the least service in the "Secret Service"
during the war, were the first to rush into
print after the war was over, blazoning their
mighty deeds of valor and shrewdness to the
world by stealing other men's thunder who
really performed the service, though they
would not claim any great credit for doing just
what was assigned them to do.

I know the above to be true from experience
—the "Back to the Front" article, etc. of one
C. S. Bell, that was published as a serial in the
New York Ledger in 1870, of which I may
write you in the future.

RED RIVER CAMP.

A Magnificent Army in the Best Fight-
ing Trim.

SABINE CROSSROADS.

An Extremely Reckless and
Unnecessary Advance.

FIGHTING AGAINST ODDS.

An Ill-fated, Ill-advised and
Disastrous Campaign.

BY W. J. LANDRAM, DVT. BRIG.-GEN., U. S. VOL.

THE Federal army in
the Department of
the Gulf was organ-
ized and concentrated
at Franklin, La., a
small village on the
Bayou Teche, early
in the Spring of 1864,
under the command
of Maj.-Gen. Frank-
lin. The troops were
composed of the Nin-
teenth Corps, under
Brig.-Gen. Emory;
part of the Thirtieth
Corps, under Brig-
ade Gen. T. E. G. Ran-
som, with a division
of cavalry under Brig-
ade Gen. A. L. Lee.

From repeated con-
versations with Gen.
Ransom I learned that it was the intention
of the Department Commander to move this
army up the Teche by land and form a junction
at Alexandria with Gen. A. J. Smith,
who had gone up Red River on transports,
in command of 10,000 men from Gen. Sher-
man's army, east of the Mississippi.

The delay occasioned by the failure of
Gen. Banks to move the troops under Gen.
Franklin enabled Gen. Smith to reach Alex-
andria nearly one week sooner than the troops
that moved by land, and also to capture Fort
DeKussy, with its garrison. The number of
troops under the command of Gen. Banks at
that time was generally understood to be as
follows: The army of Gen. A. J. Smith,
10,000 infantry; Nineteenth Corps (Gen.
Emory), 10,000; detachment Thirtieth
Corps (Gen. Ransom), 4,000; one brigade
of colored infantry, say, 1,500; Gen. Lee's
Cavalry Division, composed of four or five
brigades, numbering in the aggregate 5,000.
Accompanying each division of infantry was
the usual complement of artillery, and with
the army a number of siege-guns. The
troops were all effective, and most of them
had seen hard service. The aggregate would
make 25,500 infantry, exclusive of the cav-
alry and artillery.

THE ARMY RESTED SEVERAL DAYS
at Alexandria, during which time a detail
was made upon me as the commander of the
Fourth Division of the Thirtieth Corps for
some 40 or 50 men for fatigue duty. The
men were absent longer than I expected,
and upon sending a staff officer to inquire
into the matter I ascertained that they were
complaining of being kept at work getting
in cotton, and requested my intervention.
After some trouble in securing the proper
order they returned. An election of some
kind was held at this point, and the citizens
required to take the oath of allegiance, which
nearly all of them did, believing that the
United States authorities intended to make
a permanent occupation of the country.

It is proper to observe that the behavior
of the troops upon this march, as well as up
to the disastrous affair at Sabine Crossroads,
was as fine as the strictest discipline could
desire.

A company of cavalry accompanied each
division of infantry, who acted as guards at
the houses of citizens on the route, and with
the exception of one or two buildings which
were fired by some returned prisoners, who
were exasperated at the treatment they had
received sometime previous at the hands of
citizens, no property was destroyed.

The army then moved to Natchitoches,
and from thence to Pleasant Hill; the cav-
alry of Gen. Lee having the advance, fol-
lowed by the infantry of Gen. Ransom.
Upon arriving at Pleasant Hill, information
was received that the cavalry had been
checked some six miles in front, with a
considerable loss; that Gen. Lee had called
upon Gen. Franklin for a brigade of infantry
to go to his support; that his request had
been repeated and refused. Gen. Franklin
directing him to fall back upon the infantry
if he could not maintain his position. Ap-
plication being made to Gen. Banks, the
order was given, Gen. Franklin directing
Gen. Ransom to furnish the brigade from
his corps, stating in the order that it was
done by the direction of Gen. Banks.

These facts I learned from Gen. Ransom
at the time, and in subsequent conversations
with Gen. Franklin. An order was received
at 11 o'clock at night, directing me to take
command in person of the First Brigade of
my Division, and report to Gen. Lee by day-
light, which I did. Before starting I re-
marked to Gen. Ransom that I was satisfied
the movement would

LEAD TO EVIL RESULTS;
that the presence of the infantry would
embolden Gen. Lee to push on beyond sup-
port; that he was already six miles in
advance, and that, if he moved on in the
usual way, in case of an engagement, the
probabilities were that he would be defeated
before assistance could reach him. Gen.
Ransom concurred in this opinion, and man-
ifested great dissatisfaction with the order.

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